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FLOYD FOLLIES: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED
A four-state evacuation from Hurricane Floyd caused massive traffic foul-ups.
But South Carolina has since worked hard to improve evacuation planning.
WHO LEAVES EARLY?
Tourists are among the first to flee inland during a hurricane.
Long-time residents are likeliest to stay home.
SAFER AT HOME?
In a few coastal communities, many residents who live in well-built structures
are urgently encouraged to stay home during a hurricane.
EBBS AND FLOWS
ON THE COVER
Trapped for hours in an I-26 traffic jam during the Hurricane Floyd evacuation,
Lynn Snowden stopped along the roadside to change the diaper of her two-year-old son Jonathan.
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WHICH WAY? South Carolina emergency officials, experts say, failed
to provide clear and timely information about various evacuation routes as
Hurricane Floyd approached the southeastern coastline. PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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Brenda Gonnella, with two kids and a dog in tow,evacuated her North Charleston home mid-afternoon on Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1999, heading
toward Asheville to escape Hurricane Floyd barreling
toward the coast.
She didn’t get far, though. Gonnella soon found
herself caught by a gigantic traffic jam on I-26 snaking to
the midlands. Between 360,000 and 410,000 South
Carolinians, obeying Gov. Jim Hodges’ evacuation order,
also fled the coast that same day.
For nine hours, Gonnella and her sons Matt and
Andrew waited in the thick summer heat, their car
scarcely moving on I-26. By midnight, they had traveled
just 35 miles, and she was worried about running out of
gas. She thought of her husband, Jim, a master sergeant
who remained behind for emergency duty at the Charles-
ton Air Force Base. “I figured he would want me to stay on
the road, but my main concern was getting stuck there
during the storm. I felt that I’d rather be in my house
where I had some protection than sitting in my car, trying
to ride it out.”
Finally, she left the interstate, turned onto a side road,
and headed toward home. “People were yelling, ‘You’re
By John H. Tibbetts
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going the wrong way! A hurricane’s coming!’”
Gonnella and her children soon arrived at her house.
“My husband was preparing to leave for the base, and I
told him, ‘I couldn’t take it anymore,’ and he understood.”
 At least 3.5 million people from four states—Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina—evacuated
during Hurricane Floyd. It was the largest evacuation in
U.S. history. Lines of cars backed up for hundreds of miles
on several interstates. Trips that would have taken two
hours on a normal day took 16 or 18. Many evacuees could
not find bathrooms, motel rooms, or shelters. Cars ran out
of gas or broke down, littering highways and small roads.
“It was a horrendous evacuation,” says Don Lewis, an
evacuation expert with Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, a
consulting firm based in Tallahassee, Florida.
Since the Floyd debacle, South Carolina emergency
planners have worked diligently to improve evacuation
planning. The state has established lane-reversal strategies
on some major highways, expanded traffic monitoring
tools, disseminated public-information materials on
evacuation routes, collaborated on multi-state evacuation
planning, and other measures. South Carolina’s hurricane
preparedness ranks at the very top in the region, experts
FLASHBACK. Brenda Gonnella and her sons Matt (right) and Andrew stand on a bridge above I-26, where they got stuck for
nine hours in a massive traffic jam during the Hurricane Floyd evacuation in September 1999. PHOTO/WADE SPEES
Hurricane Floyd triggered an
evacuation fiasco across four
southeastern states. Can we
do better next time?
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say. Next time a huge hurricane
threatens the coast, South Carolina
will be better equipped to move
hundreds of thousands of people
inland.
That said, what really went
wrong during Floyd? Why did so
many people get stuck on the road
with such little guidance or aid from
government?
Floyd’s huge size complicated
matters. Approaching the U.S.
mainland, Floyd was a monster
category 4 storm on the Saffir-
Simpson scale. At one point, the
storm churned with 155-mph winds,
flirting with the rare category 5
status. Since the 1880s, only two
category 5 hurricanes have struck the
United States: an unnamed 1935
storm that hit the Florida Keys and
Camille that swamped the Missis-
sippi coast in 1969.
If you’d studied satellite
imagery on Sunday, Sept. 12, 1999
you might have noticed that Floyd’s
path resembled that of Hurricane
Andrew, which ripped through
South Florida in 1992, causing $25
billion in property damage. But
Floyd, with a diameter almost 600
miles wide, was far larger than
Andrew, although its strongest
winds were confined to an area
around the hurricane’s eye. Still,
such a huge hurricane could
endanger lives within 50 to 100
miles of the eye’s landfall.
Floyd, forecasters predicted,
would probably turn north, pushed
by an approaching trough from
the west. But forecasters could
not say when or where this turn
would occur.
Tourists and residents along
South Florida’s coastline were
ordered to leave, and emergency
officials along the entire East Coast
nervously waited for updates. If
Floyd did turn north, the South
Florida megalopolis would be
spared. But unless the storm
swerved sharply and unexpectedly
out to sea, another community up
the coast would get battered.
Emergency officials have grown
a little weary explaining that the
most dangerous hurricanes to strike
the U.S. mainland in recent years did
not hit major metropolitan areas
head on. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo’s
highest storm surge swept across
coastal villages 30 miles north of
downtown Charleston, sparing the
city from the worst. In a similar
fashion, Hurricane Andrew’s most
destructive winds did not strike
Miami. Instead, Andrew ravaged
unincorporated Miami-Dade County,
its winds scarcely affecting down-
town Miami farther north, before
sweeping through the Everglades and
into the Gulf of Mexico.
But Floyd, experts worried,
might be The Big One, which could
dwarf the American death toll of any
other tropical cyclone in recent
memory. If a category 4 or 5 hurri-
cane struck a major urban area, it
could drive a 20- to 25-foot storm
surge up creeks and rivers, killing
hundreds or even thousands. (A
storm surge is the rise in coastal
water level caused by high winds and
low barometric pressure.) Emergency
officials, hurricane experts, and
media were blunt about Floyd’s
dangers. A Florida state meteorolo-
gist described Floyd as “Andrew’s big
brother.” Jerry Jarrell, then director
of the National Hurricane Center,
declared that Floyd was “much more
dangerous than Andrew.”
The hurricane did turn north
before it could cause a catastrophe in
South Florida. But then it churned a
parallel path along the coast,
threatening the rest of the Florida
shoreline. Some Floridians fled west
across the peninsula, while others
scurried north, hoping to outrun the
storm, but the hurricane followed
them up the coast.
As many as two million
Floridians left home during Floyd,
an exodus that overwhelmed
highways and transportation
networks. As they poured into
Georgia and South Carolina, they
bumped into people traveling west
from Savannah and Charleston to
escape the hurricane. The result was
massive traffic gridlock.
To compound the problem,
each state planned and carried out
its evacuation in isolation as if it
were an independent republic with
restricted borders. “Everyone did his
own thing,” says William Massey,
hurricane program manager for the
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). “The evacuation
was not a concerted, coordinated
effort.”
State emergency managers had
scant awareness of the evacuee flood
coming up the road. “During Floyd,
emergency managers didn’t know
how bad the problem was—they
didn’t know how many people were
going from Florida to Georgia or
Georgia to South Carolina,” says Jay
Baker, a Florida State University
geographer who studies evacuations.
Meanwhile, South Carolina’s
leaders were not able to receive basic
information about traffic flow.
Various South Carolina agencies
used incompatible radio systems and
frequencies, and cell phones were
unreliable at peak usage times. So
when vehicles got stacked up for
miles, top public-safety officials
couldn’t communicate with person-
nel on the ground and didn’t know
“During Floyd, emergency
managers didn’t know how
bad the problem was—they
didn’t know how many
people were going from
Florida to Georgia or
Georgia to South Carolina.”
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RULES OF THE ROAD. South Carolina
emergency managers are now better equipped
to move hundreds of thousands of people
inland during the next major hurricane
evacuation. But citizens must cooperate and
follow proper evacuation routes to safety.
“Please use the evacuation routes designated
for your area,” says state “traffic czar”
Capt. Harry Stubblefield of the S.C.
Highway Patrol. “If people deviate from
these routes, if they know short cuts or they
think they know a better way, they’ll run into
a problem. Please use the routes we’ve
designated, in the manner we’ve designated,
unless you’re told otherwise through public
information we provide.” PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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THE BIG PICTURE. Hurricane Floyd was a monster category 4 hurricane. At Floyd’s peak,
it had stronger winds than Hugo, which devastated South Carolina in 1989, and Andrew, which
crushed South Florida in 1992. PHOTO/COURTESY OF NOAA
the extent of the problem. “We had
a failed, fractured communications
system,” says state “traffic czar”
Capt. Harry Stubblefield of the
S.C. Highway Patrol. “We didn’t
have a good feel for monitoring
(the evacuation), and we couldn’t
give our commanders the big
picture to let them know what was
going on.”
South Carolina officials were
unprepared to reverse lanes of I-26,
that is, to turn coast-bound lanes
into inland-bound lanes, allowing
traffic to flow faster from the storm.
“Our decision-making was a little
bit behind,” says Jon Boettcher,
hurricane coordinator with the
S.C. Emergency Management
Division. After receiving blistering
criticism for the stalled traffic, Gov.
Jim Hodges ordered lane reversals
on I-26, which took several hours
to complete.
Most Charleston-area evacuees
piled onto I-26, ignoring parallel
routes on smaller roads. People
were left to their own navigational
resources because emergency
planners did not offer enough
information about other possible
routes. “The problem was that we
were not managing the road network,”
says Stubblefield.
Luckily for South Carolina, Floyd
eventually lost strength and continued
due north, its weaker, western edge
sweeping the state’s coastline with
relatively light winds.
When the storm made landfall
near Cape Fear, North Carolina, at
2:00 a.m. on Sept. 16, it was a
category 2 storm, with maximum
winds just over 100 miles per hour.
Even so, Floyd dumped 15 inches of
rain in 12 hours in eastern North
Carolina, driving a record storm surge
across Albermarle Sound. By the time
Floyd moved out to sea on Sept. 17, it
had been responsible for 56 deaths—
all from falling trees and inland
riverine flooding.
 It’s important to remember,
however, that the Floyd evacuation
was effective in some respects.
Throughout the four-state region,
there were no recorded deaths from
storm surge, historically the biggest
killer during hurricanes.
 Moreover, Horry County resi-
dents offered few complaints about
the Floyd evacuation, perhaps because
Who leaves early?
From long experience, emergency
planners have learned which popula-
tions respond quickly during hurricane
evacuations and which dawdle or dig in
their heels and refuse to leave.
Tourists, especially ones from inland
states, are fastest responders.
“Tourists from Ohio, for example,
don’t know the difference between a
hurricane and a tornado,” says Ashby
Ward, president of the Myrtle Beach
Area Chamber of Commerce. “They
only know that a hurricane is larger.
They think that a hurricane can strike
at a moment’s notice, so they start
getting very skittish when a hurricane
is a thousand miles away. We start
getting callers a week in advance (of a
hurricane’s potential landfall in South
Carolina), asking, ‘Should I leave
now?’”
Vacationers with children evacuate
earliest of all. “Family vacationers will
be gone from the area quickly,” says
Paul Whitten, director of public safety
for Horry County. “They’ll say, ‘I don’t
need this.’” During summer months,
hurricane-evacuation routes fill up
rapidly with family tourists heading out
of town.
 It’s the old-timers, people who have
lived on the coast for 10 or more
years, who are most resistant to
leaving for a hurricane, says Whitten.
“You have people on the front beach
who will not evacuate.”
Some of these long-time residents
claim that they’ve survived several
hurricanes in Horry County, including
Hugo, Bonnie, Fran, and Bertha, yet
these windstorms only lightly touched
the Myrtle Beach area. Whitten
reminds people that the last major
storm to cause severe damage in
Horry County was Hazel, which made
landfall along the South Carolina-North
Carolina border in 1954, destroying
beachfront homes.
Some homeowners in floodprone
areas remain stubbornly blind to the
risks they face. “Some people want to
stay with their homes,” says Stacy R.
Stewart, a hurricane specialist with the
National Hurricane Center. “They say, ‘I
put my life into it.’ Yes, but they may
literally put their lives into it.”
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O fficials in a few hurricane-prone communities are vigorously encouraging resi-dents who live outside of storm-surge areas in well-built structures to stay home.   One example is the South Florida megalopolis (pop. 5.1 million), where
evacuation routes are extremely limited. Evacuees from Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, and
Palm Beach have only two directions to escape a storm: north and west, along highways
where traffic jams occur during daily rush hours.
That’s why emergency officials urgently encourage most South Florida residents to
stay home or move to a well-built structure nearby, preferably within their own county,
and avoid an evacuation on overcrowded roads.
Tony Carper, director of the Broward County (Florida) Emergency Management Agency,
says, “If you’re out of the storm-surge zone and you live in substantial housing and you
apply the necessary window and door protections and get the necessary emergency
supplies, you’ll be more comfortable staying at home. If you’re going to evacuate, travel
the shortest distance possible. Stay with friends or family who live nearby in substantial
housing. But do not attempt to get onto our interstate highway system and travel to
another part of the state.”
With the help of Florida Atlantic International University, Broward County did an
extensive topographic survey of the county’s coastal zone using an innovative laser
technology called LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), which has an accuracy of plus or
minus 15 centimeters. Next, the county compared its coastal elevation to the storm-
surge modelling done by the National Hurricane Center. The comparison allowed the
county to redefine its evacuation zones much more accurately.
Now many Broward County residents who live in areas that would experience minor
(not life-threatening) storm-surge flooding would not have to evacuate during a hurri-
cane. Experts say that’s a radical departure from the norm. In most hurricane-prone
coastal areas, flood maps are cruder, and emergency managers have less information
about the potential depth of coastal flooding during hurricanes. As a result, larger areas
must be evacuated in advance of a storm.
 Since Hurricane Andrew hit South Florida in 1992, Broward County has also
established and enforced stricter standards for hurricane-resistant construction.
Contractors, for example, must install high-quality shutters or super-strong glass in
each new single-family home. When windows shatter, hurricane winds pour through
the opening, dramatically increasing air pressure inside the house. This internal
pressure, combined with external wind pressures, can break the house “envelope” at
its weakest point, usually the roof.
Window-protection devices and stronger roofs make houses safer during hurricanes, so
that more residents can stay home instead of relocating during hurricanes, engineers say.
“You need to think about ways to strengthen your house or move to another structure
locally that is safe, so you don’t have to become involved in the larger evacuation,” says
Sea Grant researcher Tim Reinhold, a civil-engineering professor at Clemson University.
Some new homes in coastal South Carolina will soon have greater protection from
high winds. The city of Charleston and Charleston and Georgetown counties will require
that all new houses be supplied with window-protection devices such as impact-resistant
glass, shutters, or pre-cut plywood.
A new statewide building code, the International Residential Code, is to be adopted by
all jurisdictions between April 1 and July 1, 2002. But the S.C. Building Code Council
has placed a moratorium on the seismic and high wind/wind-borne debris sections until
July 1, 2003, pending further study. The city of Charleston, however, has received an
exemption from the moratorium, as have Charleston and Georgetown counties.
they had faced so many trial runs,
having been evacuated three
times in the previous three
years—Bertha and Fran in 1996,
and Bonnie in 1998. Each of
those hurricanes swept past and
hit North Carolina.
Nevertheless, the typical 75-
minute drive from the Grand
Strand to Florence still required
five to six hours during the Floyd
evacuation’s peak traffic conges-
tion. “Maybe there are more
realistic expectations here” about
travel times, says Paul Whitten,
public-safety director for Horry
County. Also, most of Horry
County’s evacuees had dispersed
before they bumped into heavy
northbound traffic on I-95.
Elsewhere, though, the Floyd
evacuation was considered a flop.
Traffic tie-ups on interstate
highways embarrassed political
leaders and infuriated voters.
Since Floyd, Brenda
Gonnella and her husband have
discussed whether to stay home
when another giant hurricane
approaches South Carolina. Jim
Gonnella notes that their house
could not withstand a major
hurricane, and he plans on
getting his family out early next
time. Brenda says, “I wouldn’t
fight that traffic again. That
experience put me in the mindset
of, ‘I’ll just stay here next time.’
But my husband says, ‘I don’t
think so.’”
MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS
Emergency officials are always
searching for glitches in their
disaster plans. Drills are rarely
sufficient. Sooner or later,
planners must experience the real
thing—the major disaster—to
find the inevitable kinks in their
systems. And that’s what Floyd
did: it exposed some flaws in
hurricane preparedness that the
state is working to fix.
For many evacuees, the most
glaring flaw was a lack of reversed
lanes on major highways. Since
Floyd, the S.C. Dept. of Public
Safety has developed workable lane
reversals for I-26 between Charles-
ton and Columbia, U.S. 17 south in
Georgetown County, and U.S. 278
in Beaufort County. If a giant storm
threatens South Carolina anytime
soon, the governor would probably
reverse lanes of I-26 and perhaps
other highways, experts say. Each state
from Texas to North Carolina,
moreover, plans to reverse at least one
road in case of a major storm.
Safer at home?
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 South Carolina emergency
personnel and law-enforcement
agencies also now have better
communications tools, with
improved two-way radio equip-
ment and coordination among
agencies. “We’ll be able to talk to
who we need to, when we need
to,” says Stubblefield.
The state has expanded its
traffic-monitoring capabilities
with 34 closed-circuit television
cameras on hurricane routes,
aircraft, and automated speed
detectors. Traffic information will
be relayed to the state emergency
operations center. From there,
emergency managers can send
messages via cell phone to solar-
powered highway signs, which
guide evacuees to less congested
routes, according to Dick Jenkins,
an engineer with the S.C. Dept. of
Transportation. The state will roll
out portable roadside radio trans-
mitters that provide detailed traffic
information.
The idea is “to keep people
moving,” says Stubblefield, “so they
are able to get on and off the inter-
state at will, to find food and refuge,
rather than being stacked up.”
Next time, federal traffic experts
will monitor any multi-state evacua-
tion. A special team led by federal
highway officials will gather at
FEMA’s Atlanta regional headquar-
ters to coordinate information
during a major storm that sends
people scurrying across multiple
state lines. In the past, “federal highway
officials were not major players in
hurricane evacuation planning, but
that situation has improved dramati-
cally,” says Baker.
The team will employ a Web-based
program called the Evacuation Traffic
Information System (ETIS), which
relies on built-in data from hurricane
evacuation studies and real-time
information from states and counties on
tourism occupancy, traffic counts,
evacuation participation rates, and
other data. The program, displaying
information on an interactive map,
predicts traffic volumes across a multi-
state region. Hurricane program
managers at state emergency-operations
centers will view the map at the same
time. Thus, if there is a huge northward
THE GREAT ESCAPE. Heading toward I-26, cars were backed up on I-526 during the Hurricane Floyd evacuation. In four southeastern states, ca
some major highways, which should reduce traffic snarls next time. PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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movement of people from Florida
and Georgia next time, South
Carolina will have early warning.
Southeastern states have
conducted two major exercises to
test the ETIS program. The system,
says Lewis, seemed to work well,
though “we’ve not had a major
hurricane requiring a big evacua-
tion during the past two years, so it
hasn’t been tested in real time.”
When each hurricane season
begins on June 1, the S.C. Emer-
gency Management Division
disseminates 500,000 evacuation
maps, offering route guidance for
each coastal region. In a voluntary
evacuation, travelers can take any
road they wish. But once the
governor announces a mandatory
evacuation, law enforcement will
likely guide many travelers to pre-
determined routes. “We put a lot of
effort into making sure that we can
maintain traffic flow, as much as we
possibly can, on the routes we’ve
determined to be evacuation
routes,” says Stubblefield. “If people
deviate from those routes—if they
know short cuts or they think have a
better way—they’ll run into a
(traffic) problem. Please use the
routes that we’ve designated unless
you’re told otherwise through public
information that we provide.”
 Not every state vulnerable to
hurricanes learned lessons from
Floyd. “There are states where
evacuees are on their own,” where
people receive little guidance from
government about the best routes to
take, says Lewis. “Then there are other
states that are really getting their acts
together.” South Carolina is one of the
latter. Lewis says, “There is no state
that has better preparation for hurri-
cane evacuations.”
For an evacuation to work
smoothly, emergency managers must
do their jobs efficiently, citizens must
heed evacuation orders promptly, and
the hurricane must stay offshore long
enough to allow people to escape.
Government, however, can’t
evacuate the entire South Carolina
coastline as quickly as many would like.
An estimated 64 percent of South
Carolina’s coastal residents—591,000 to
673,000 people—left their homes
during Floyd over two days, according
ars were stalled for hundreds of miles on major highways. South Carolina emergency managers are prepared to implement lane-reversal procedures for
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Web sites
National Hurricane Center: www.nhc.noaa.gov
S.C. Emergency Management Division: www.state.sc.us/emd
S.C. Traffic Network: www.sctraffic.org
113 Calhoun St.: www.113Calhoun.org
Sea Grant HazNet: www.haznet.org
National Data Buoy Center: www.ndbc.noaa.gov
Hurricane tracking site: hurricane.terrapin.com
to a study by the University of South
Carolina Hazards Research Lab.
“When you’re trying to move as many
people as we’re trying to move, there
will be some delays,” says William
Winn, emergency manager for
Beaufort County. “If people want to
avoid those delays, they need to leave
earlier. If everybody tries to get on the
road at the same time, we’re going to
have problems.”
Too many people squeezing onto
too few roads—there’s the rub. Each
year, thousands of new residents
migrate to the South Carolina coast,
but our highway systems can’t keep
pace. Horry County’s population
swelled by 37 percent in the 1990s,
Beaufort County by 40 percent, and
the Charleston metropolitan area by
8 percent. And tourism in the coastal
plain is flourishing. The Grand
Strand alone routinely attracts
400,000 tourists on summer week-
ends and up to a half-million on
Labor Day weekend.
“Coastal population growth is
outstripping the transportation
network’s capacity to efficiently
handle all the traffic,” says Boettcher.
“Traffic engineers are constantly
looking for new routes, better ways to
do things, better ways to gather
evacuation information. But the road
infrastructure just isn’t there.”
The number of vehicles on the
road during evacuations has grown
even faster than the coastal popula-
tion. During Floyd, about 25 percent
of households from the Charleston
area evacuated in more than one
vehicle. “One of the reasons that the
roads were so clogged was because
people were taking more than one
car,” says Susan L. Cutter, a geogra-
pher at the University of South
Carolina who studies evacuation
behavior. Many families also hauled
boats or recreational vehicles, adding
to congestion. “People were evacuat-
ing as a household unit, but they
were traveling in separate cars and
communicating by cell phone, doing
it in a caravan.”
LEAVE EARLY!
The best evacuation plan in the
world, experts say, won’t work if
citizens fail to leave dangerous
places early.
If you’re thinking about escaping
the coast during the next hurricane,
remember one thing: leave before
you’re ordered to go. That is, leave
early—at least 36 to 48 hours before
a major storm’s expected landfall—if
you live in a flood-prone house or a
mobile home in a coastal area. Leave
early if you think your house can’t
bear up to hurricane-force winds.
Leave early if you have special
needs—an elderly relative, for
example, who can’t cope with hours
stuck in traffic.
It’s important to leave early
because tropical cyclones are unpre-
dictable. Hurricane forecasts have
become more accurate over the past
30 years due to improved computer
models and satellite information. But
when the National Hurricane Center
forecasters estimate that a hurricane
would strike 24 hours before landfall,
they still have an average error of
nearly 70 miles. At 48 hours before
landfall, they have an average error of
almost 130 miles. At 72 hours, they
have an error of 200 miles. A hurri-
cane expected to strike a couple
hundred
miles from
your house
three days
hence could
turn and hit
you instead.
Fore-
casting
inaccuracies are inevitable, given
tropical cyclones’ erratic tempera-
ments. Hurricanes can turn on a
dime, loop crazily, and abruptly speed
up or slow down. Tropical cyclones
can intensify dramatically and
suddenly, but scientists still have the
greatest difficulty in forecasting
storm intensity, says Stacy R.
Stewart, a hurricane specialist with
the National Hurricane Center.
Andrew and Hugo each grew from a
category 2 to a category 4 storm in
less than 12 hours.
Twenty-four hours before
landfall, a hurricane could be a
dawdling category 2. Just before it
comes ashore, however, it could
speed up and intensify to a category
4, driving floodwaters much farther
inland than anticipated. People who
stay home expecting a relatively
mild hurricane could face a massive
storm—and then it’d be too late
to leave.
 An evacuation order must be
issued far in advance of a storm eye
coming ashore. That way, residents
have enough time to travel to a safe
location before the arrival of gale-
force winds (39 miles per hour). To
ensure public safety, emergency
planners want everyone off the road
15 to 24 hours before the storm’s eye
makes landfall, depending on the
storm’s forward speed.
Emergency planners must also
factor in a community’s clearance
time—the time needed to move all
residents and tourists who want to
leave to higher ground or safe
shelter. During a major hurricane
threat, Horry County, for example,
requires a clearance time of about 24
hours to evacuate its peak coastal
population.
All told, a mandatory evacua-
tion might have to start 48 hours
before a major storm strikes a
community. Yet vulnerable residents
and tourists should leave the
coastline during the voluntary
evacuation, which precedes the
governor’s mandatory order.
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DEMOLITION MAN. Your roof is one of the weakest points in your
house during a hurricane. Plywood roofing sheets held down by nails can be
ripped off by high winds. When you’re ready to replace your roof covering,
you should also re-fasten your plywood sheathing, which can provide a
significant reduction in your roof’s vulnerability to high winds.
Sea Grant researcher Tim Reinhold, a civil-engineering professor
at Clemson University, adjusts a “nail-puller” device installed as an
exhibit at the 113 Calhoun Street center in Charleston. Engineers
use this device to test how much force is required to pull
a nail or screw out of a two-by-four. A Sea Grant study
illustrated that ringshank nails used to attach plywood can
withstand twice as much pressure as a regular nail, and
screws can withstand four times as much
pressure as a regular nail. PHOTO/WADE SPEES
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Contacts
Jon Boettcher, S.C. Emergency
Management Division,
(803) 737-8500.
Dennis Clark, Charleston
County, (843) 202-7400.
Susan L. Cutter, USC,
(803) 777-5941.
Don Lewis, PBS&J,
(850) 575-1800.
William Massey, FEMA,
(770) 220-5430.
Tim Reinhold, Clemson
University, (864) 656-5941.
Harry Stubblefield, S.C.
Highway Patrol,
(803) 896-4786.
Paul Whitten, Horry County,
(843) 248-1225.
William Winn, Beaufort
County, (843) 470-3100.
“If people who are in harm’s way
wait for a governor’s mandatory order to
evacuate, then they’re missing the boat,
it’s too late,” says Dennis Clark, emer-
gency manager for Charleston County.
Waiting for a mandatory order
heightens your risks of getting stuck on
the highway network. When Floyd
roared up the coastline, thousands of cars
heading west and north from Jackson-
ville, Florida, were still stuck in traffic
jams. Floyd, a category 4 hurricane at
that time, could have made landfall in
northeastern Florida, catching them on
the road. At 100 miles per hour–the wind
speed of a category 2 hurricane–wind
pressures can begin lifting cars, says Baker.
That’s the nightmare of every
emergency manager in a hurricane-prone
area: thousands of evacuees trapped in
cars thrown around like toys by high
winds.
 But leaving early isn’t easy. One-
third of Charleston-area residents polled
by Florida State University researchers
reported that someone in their house-
hold had to work during the Floyd
evacuation, and many said it delayed their
departure.
 “A lot of employers, during both
Hugo and Floyd, told their workers to
come in to work that morning, during the
voluntary evacuation,” says Clark. “They
said they would let workers go at mid-day.
So you had a lot of folks who were hitting
the road when they got off work,” and
they drove immediately into the worst of
the congestion. “Plenty of those people
would’ve already left home ten hours
earlier if they’d had the chance.”
WHO SHOULD GO?
The largest evacuation in American
history was also the largest “over-evacua-
tion,” some experts say. Many who ran
from Floyd probably did not need to.
Meanwhile, many vulnerable people who
should have evacuated did not leave.
About one-half of the 3.5 million
evacuees in the four-state region were
actually ordered to leave, Massey points
out. Only a narrow strip of Florida’s eastern
coastline was evacuated under mandatory
COUNTDOWN. Approaching the
coast, Hurricane Floyd swerved away
from South Carolina, striking near
Cape Fear, North Carolina.
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ANIMAL HOUSE. During Hurricane Floyd,
Shakia Rivers of James Island held her dog
Foxy Lady at the North Charleston
Coliseum, a shelter for pets and their owners.
For a list of pet-friendly motels in South
Carolina, visit this Clemson University
Web site: www.clemson.edu/ep/motels.htm
PHOTO/WADE SPEES
orders, yet frightened inland dwellers
from places like Orlando, a hundred
miles from the sea, also fled north.
Many upland dwellers in South
Carolina left town, although the
governor evacuated primarily low-
lying areas under a mandatory order.
 People who live in solidly built
homes on high ground but who
relocate anyway are called “shadow”
evacuees, in the parlance of emergency
managers. Shadow evacuees greatly
exacerbated the massive multi-state
traffic jam during Floyd, making it
more difficult for the most vulnerable
people to get out of harm’s way.
Yet emergency officials “are not
very aggressive about telling people
(who live in upland areas in well-
built homes) not to evacuate,” says
Baker. “Maybe they’re afraid of being
sued.” Or maybe they’re afraid to
have deaths and injuries on their
conscience. “What if you tell some-
one ‘Don’t leave’ and then a tree falls
through their house and kills them?”
asks Massey.
The South Carolina coast, with
its many creeks and rivers, compli-
cates individual evacuation decisions.
Under a worst-case scenario during a
category 4 storm, some Charleston-
area neighborhoods along the rivers
20 miles inland from the coast can
face a dangerous storm surge, accord-
ing to a Jan. 2001 study by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. As a storm
surge is driven into a river basin, it
can pile up higher and higher as the
basin narrows. “A lot of people aren’t
aware of how far surge can go inland,”
says Stewart. To learn if you live in a
flood-hazard area, contact your
insurer or local planning and zoning
department.
For now, the Palmetto State has
enough roadways to evacuate all
coastal residents and tourists, regard-
less of whether they live or play along
the beachfront or in a well-built
structure on high ground 30 miles from
the shoreline. But can South
Carolina’s transportation network
keep pace with an ever-growing
coastal population? Can the regional
transportation highway network cope
with population increases along the
coast from South Florida to North
Carolina?
Floyd’s track, after all, was not so
unusual. Hurricanes Bertha and Fran
also traveled north up the coast,
threatening Florida, then Georgia,
then South Carolina, before striking
North Carolina. “The only difference
is that Bertha and Fran were not
very strong storms when they made
the pass” up the coast, says Massey.
“The Floyd track was a pretty
common track if you look at
history and climatology.” We
should expect and plan for another
multi-state evacuation like the one
for Floyd, he says.
But the effectiveness of the
next major hurricane response will
“depend on how quickly people
follow the recommendations by
state government to evacuate early
and along designated routes,” says
Stubblefield. “If people wait until
the last minute to get on the road
network and we have a tremen-
dous number doing that at one
time, it’ll be difficult.”
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Beach Sweep/River
Sweep 2002
Statewide, South Carolina
Sept. 21, 2002
Each year thousands of people
become part of the “Solution to
Pollution” during Beach Sweep/River
Sweep, South Carolina’s largest one-
day cleanup of beaches and waterways.
The event is part of the International
Coastal Cleanup and anyone can
participate—individuals, families,
schools, civic clubs, or businesses.
To volunteer call Susan Ferris,
coastal coordinator, at (843) 727-2078
or Bobbie Adams, inland coordinator,
at (803) 734-9108. For more informa-
tion, visit http://scseagrant.org/
education/education bsrs.htm.
Coastal Heritage is printed
on recycled paper.
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6th International
Conference on
Shellfish Restoration
Charleston, South Carolina
Nov. 20-24, 2002
This conference will provide an
opportunity for government
officials, resource managers, and
users to discuss approaches to restore
coastal ecosystems through shellfish
habitat management and enhance-
ment, shellfish restoration through
watershed management and
community-based strategies to
restore shellfish habitat. Those
interested in participating and
gaining information about submit-
ting an abstract should visit
http://www.scseagrant.org/icsr.htm.
SUBSCRIPTIONS ARE FREE UPON REQUEST BY CONTACTING: ANNETTE.DUNMEYER@SCSEAGRANT.ORG
_
Southeast Coastal
Ocean Science
Conference
Charleston, South Carolina
January 29-31, 2003
The conference will focus on
current and planned research, outreach,
education, observations, monitoring,
assessments, and management in the
South Atlantic Bight. Scientists,
resource managers, and others working
in coastal and coastal ocean environ-
ments in the southeastern United
States, from watersheds out to the shelf-
edge environment, are invited to
attend. For additional information,
contact Rick DeVoe at
Rick.DeVoe@scseagrant.org or
(843) 727-2078.
